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THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF JOINT 
VENTURE PARTIES – WHEN DO THEY 
ARISE AND WHAT DO THEY 
COMPRISE? 
Jane Knowler* and Charles Rickett** 
Joint Ventures are often used by parties in commercial enterprises where parties seek to achieve a 
common goal. One issue which is increasingly contentious is the extent to which, if any, joint 
venture parties owe each other fiduciary obligations. This paper refutes, as a dangerous heresy, the 
idea that joint venture relationships are discrete legal relationships that are inherently fiduciary in 
nature. The majority of self-styled "joint ventures" are, invariably, nothing more in legal terms than 
contracts. If parties are going to be bound by fiduciary duties, over and above the contractual duties 
they owe each other, this will only be so by virtue of the particular arrangement they have entered 
into which, on a thorough examination of the facts, is found to require each party to give unstinting 
loyalty to the other. Recent Australian case law bears this out. 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is a considerable privilege to be able to write for a collection which honours a colleague and 
friend of many years' standing. David McLauchlan is one of the very finest common law lawyers we 
know. His commitment to the art of lawyering and to the teaching of that art are testified to by the 
reams of scholarship that have emanated from his pen (and latterly his word-processor), and by 
generations of his students, in both New Zealand and Australia. His friendship over the years has 
been a blessing to receive and experience. Forty years of teaching and writing is quite something to 
be proud of! May his stamina last for many more years too.  
Writing during the early years of David's career, but even then more than three decades ago, 
Professor Ernest Weinrib, (someone one of us had the joy of introducing David to at a dinner party 
in Brisbane in 2007), observed that in the 250 years following the seminal decision in Keech v 
Sandford1 "the notion of the high standard incumbent on a fiduciary has spread from its original 
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homeland in the law of trusts and has subjected a diverse variety of entrepreneurs - directors, agents, 
partners, employees – to its colonizing sway".2 Today, a number of legal relationships presume the 
existence of fiduciary duties. These comprise the widely "accepted fiduciary relationships, such as 
trustee and beneficiary, agent and principal, solicitor and client, employee and employer, director 
and company, and partners …".3 The fiduciary standard has been alleged to have colonised yet more 
contemporary commercial relationships and created a new presumptive fiduciary relationship called 
a "joint venture" which is governed by its own body of law.4 We endorse the view that joint 
ventures are neither discrete legal entities nor relationships that are inherently fiduciary in nature, 
and that the very idea of "joint venture law" is not only a fallacy,5 but a dangerous heresy. The 
majority of self-styled "joint ventures" are, invariably, nothing more in legal terms than contracts. If 
parties are going to be bound by fiduciary duties, over and above the contractual duties they owe 
each other, this will only be by virtue of the particular arrangement they have entered into which, on 
a thorough examination of the facts, is found to require each party to give unstinting loyalty to the 
other. That undertaking of loyalty justifies each party reposing trust and confidence in the other, so 
that one can safely conclude they are bound by fiduciary ties (which manifest themselves as 
fiduciary duties) to each other. This type of thorough factual examination is exemplified by the 
recent decision of the High Court of Australia in John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City 
Tennis Club Ltd.6 As a result of such examination, the Court's rather trenchant conclusion was that 
no fiduciary duties bound the parties and indeed no relationship existed which could properly be 
described on any count as a joint venture. Before we analyse this decision, we briefly outline the 
idea of a "joint venture" and the content of "fiduciary duties", since the ubiquitous presence of both 
concepts in contemporary private law discourse belies a proper understanding of their true nature.  
  
1  (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, 25 ER 223. 
2  Ernest J Weinrib "The Fiduciary Obligation" (1975) 25 UTLJ 1. 
3  Breen v Williams (1995) 186 CLR 71 at 92 (per Dawson and Toohey JJ).  
4  Chirnside v Fay [2006] NZSC 68, [2007] 1 NZLR 433. For a discussion of this decision, together with 
Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2007] NZSC 26, [2007] 3 NZLR 169 and Amaltal 
Corporation Ltd v Maruha Corporation [2007] NZSC 40, [2007] 3 NZLR 192, see Jessica Palmer and 
Charles Rickett "Joint Ventures and Fiduciary Law" in Maree Chetwin and Phillip Joseph (eds) Joint  
Ventures Law (Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law Inc, University of Canterbury, 2008) 81.  
5  Stephen Kós "Joint Ventures: The Collision between Contractual and Fiduciary Obligations" in Maree 
Chetwin and Phillip Joseph (eds) Joint Ventures Law (Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law Inc, 
University of Canterbury, 2008) 23. 
6  [2010] HCA 19, (2010) 241 CLR 1. 
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II JOINT VENTURES 
In a colloquial sense joint ventures are business arrangements whereby parties collaborate in a 
one-off enterprise "usually (but not necessarily) contributing, money, property or skill"7 in a 
"particular trading, commercial, mining or other financial undertaking"8 to achieve certain outcomes 
which might include containing costs, limiting exposure to risk, increasing market strength, 
generating a product which will yield each party a separate profit or otherwise more generally 
sharing profits, whether equally or not. The term "joint venture" is itself "a vague one, capable of a 
range of applications… often used to bolster a conclusion that a fiduciary relationship exists".9 No 
particular business structure is mandated for joint ventures; they are implemented through any of a 
series of interlocking contracts, partnerships, companies, or trusts, or by way of agency or joint 
ownership.10 There is usually some form of contractual arrangement that governs the way the joint 
venture is to be carried out11 but the absence of a formal agreement is not fatal to the existence of a 
joint venture.12 Ultimately, whether a joint venture can (or indeed should) ever be classified as a 
discrete form of legal relationship which has its own particular rights and duties, distinct from a 
contract, partnership or any other form of established and recognised legal relationship, depends on 
the nature of the obligations that the joint venture parties have assumed. If such obligations or duties 
require the parties to act at most only with due care and/or in good faith towards each other that puts 
an end to further enquiry. The so-called "joint venture" is, in law, nothing other than a contract. The 
parties are bound by the express and implied terms of the agreement between them. If one of the 
parties breaches the agreement the remaining parties are left to their traditional and well-established 
remedies for breach of contract.  
However, if an examination of the duties that the parties have assumed13 reveals that, in addition 
to any duties of care and/or good faith, they are mutually required to put the other's or their joint 
interest ahead of their own individual interest (in other words, that their duty is to act "with utmost 
loyalty" towards their fellow venturer/s), then their relationship will be a "joint venture" that 
involves fiduciary duties. The issue in that context will be to determine to which aspect of the 
parties' joint venture such fiduciary duties extend. To ask whether the relationship is fiduciary and 
  
7  United Dominion Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 1, at 10. 
8  Ibid. 
9  John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd, above n 6, at [44]. 
10  United Dominion Corporation Ltd v  Brian Pty Ltd, above n 7, at 10. 
11  Such contractual arrangements would typically include unit trust deeds (trust joint venture), shareholder 
agreements (incorporated joint venture), joint venture agreements (unincorporated joint venture), or agency 
or partnership agreements/deeds.  
12  United Dominion Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd, above n 7; Chirnside v Fay, above n 4. 
13  As manifested by the terms of any written agreement and/or by what they have said and/or done.  
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then seek to ascertain the extent of the duties owed, in effect puts the cart before the horse. The 
analytically correct, and accordingly in our view preferable, way to proceed is to examine and 
evaluate the content of the duties that the parties have agreed to or undertaken. If such examination 
reveals that the duties compel loyalty, the parties' "relationship" inevitably assumes a fiduciary 
status. It is only when that conclusion is reached that the aspect over which it is claimed that the 
fiduciary duties extend can be examined, so as to ascertain whether or not there has been a breach 
and whether or not the aggrieved party is entitled to claim equitable relief.14  
III FIDUCIARY DUTY 
The content of the fiduciary duty compels complete loyalty. Millett LJ in Bristol and West 
Building Society v Mothew described it in the following way:15 
The distinguishing obligation of the fiduciary is loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded 
loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must 
not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his  duty and his interest 
may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or for the benefit of a third person without the informed 
consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the 
nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary.  
What is important to notice here is that a duty of loyalty is different from a duty to act in the best 
interests of the principal. Transactions between individuals occur in the context of a continuum of 
different behaviours ranging from coercion at the one end to altruism at the other. All such 
transactions are informed by different legal standards which are manifested in the various familiar 
doctrines of duties of care, unconscionable conduct, good faith and fair dealing, and fiduciary 
duties. As Professor Finn (as he then was) observed over twenty years ago in an important paper, all 
except the last mentioned standard in the list are concerned with mediating between the several 
interests of the parties to a relationship.16 For instance, a duty not to act unconscionably allows A to 
act self-interestedly provided A eschews excessive self interest at the point of transacting by not 
exploiting B's interests where B is in a position of vulnerability. So too a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing enables A to promote A's own interests provided that at the same time she has positive 
regard for B's interests.17 Fiduciary duties of loyalty, on the other hand, have an entirely different 
focus. Acting loyally towards B requires A to "act selflessly",18 and thus to eschew self-interest 
  
14  Birtchnell v The Equity Trustees, Executors and Agency Company Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 384, at 408–410 (per 
Dixon J). 
15  [1998] Ch 1 at 18. 
16  PD Finn "The Fiduciary Principle" in T G Youdan (ed) Equity: Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, Toronto, 
1989) 1. 
17  Ibid, at 4. 
18  Ibid. 
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entirely. A must act solely or exclusively in the interests of B to the exclusion of A's own interest.19 
This translates in the case of both a partnership and a joint venture relationship having fiduciary 
incidents to the fiduciary party being obliged to subordinate his own interest to the mutual or joint 
interests of the association or venture rather than subordinating his interest to the best interest of his 
partner or fellow joint venturer. This duty of loyalty expresses itself in two central themes which 
have been described thus:20  
The first is that which appropriates for the benefit of the person to whom the fiduciary duty is owed any 
benefit or gain obtained or received by the fiduciary in circumstances where there existed a conflict of 
personal interest and fiduciary duty or a significant possibility of such conflict: the objective is to 
preclude the fiduciary from being swayed by considerations of personal interest. The second is that 
which requires the fiduciary to account for any benefit or gain obtained or received by reason of or by 
use of his fiduciary position or of opportunity or knowledge resulting from it: the objective is to 
preclude the fiduciary from actually misusing his position for his personal advantage.  
The content of the duty of loyalty as manifested in these central ideas of "precluding undisclosed 
conflict of duty and interest (or of duty and duty), and of prohibiting misuse of fiduciary position"21 
is, in New Zealand and Australia22 in any event, widely accepted.  
The same level of acceptance is however more difficult to discern when it comes to the thorn ier 
issue of pinpointing when and why fiduciary duties arise. Those who embark on the quest of 
identifying what features a relationship must exhibit so as to be the subject of fiduciary duties 
invariably commence their task by trotting out the well worn list of accepted "status" or nominate 
fiduciary relationships previously referred to.23 This they do, not only to provide a basis from which 
they are able to draw analogies so as to determine if fiduciary duties are present in relationships 
other than those nominate ones, but also in the hope that those relationships will themselves reveal 
some underlying and unifying factor to demonstrate when and to explain why fiduciary duties arise. 
  
19  Gibson Motorsport Merchandise Pty Ltd v Forbes [2006] FCAFC 44, (2006) 149 FCR 569 at [12] (per Finn 
J). 
20  Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178, 198–199 (per Deane J). 
21  Gibson Motorsport Merchandise Pty Ltd v Forbes, above n 19, at [12]. 
22  Arklow Investments Ltd v Maclean [2000] 2 NZLR 1 (PC); Breen v Williams, above n 3; Pilmer v The Duke 
Group Ltd (in liq) [2001] HCA 31, (2001) 207 CLR 165. See, in contrast, the position in Canada where 
fiduciary duties are said to be prescriptive as well as proscriptive in nature: see McInerney v MacDonald  
(1992) 93 DLR (4th) 415 (SCC); Jacks v Davis (1982) 141 DLR (3rd) 355 (BCCA); Norberg v Wynrib 
(1992) 92 DLR (4th) (SCC). 
23  Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 68 (per Gibbs CJ) and at 
96 (per Mason J). 
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Thus, for example, Mason J in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation 
identified as a "critical feature" the idea of an "undertaking":24  
The critical feature is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests 
of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other 
person in a legal or practical sense.  
Other courts have preferred different factors. In deciding that fiduciary duties are owed by one 
party to another, such duties have been said to be grounded in trust and confidence, 25 
vulnerability,26 inequality of bargaining power27 and reasonable expectations.28 The importunate 
use of such language has resulted in "abracadabra law"29 that threatens to "overwhelm" rather than 
to "illuminate".30 The recent trio of decisions in the New South Wales Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeal and the High Court of Australia in John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club 
Ltd31 attests to this trend. 
IV JOHN ALEXANDER'S CLUBS PTY LTD V WHITE CITY 
TENNIS CLUB LTD  
A The Facts 
John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd ("JACS") was a company that developed sporting facilities for 
use by clubs. In late 2004 it became involved in the sale and purchase of a 4.5 hectare property in 
Paddington, Sydney owned by Tennis NSW, on which stood tennis courts, centre court stands and a 
car park ("the White City Land"). From 1948, White City Tennis Club ("the Club") had, through a 
series of leases and licences, used part of this land for its sporting activities. At the time of the 
events that later resulted in the litigation, the Club leased part of the Northern Stand building on the 
White City Land for use as its clubhouse. This lease was due to expire in 2020. It also had an annual 
  
24  Ibid, at 96. 
25  Day v Mead [1987] 2 NZLR 443 (CA) at 459–460 (per Somers J). 
26  Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation, above n 23, at 142 (per Dawson J); Lac 
Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14. 
27  Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation, above n 23, at 70 (per Gibbs CJ). 
28  Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd, above n 26, at 29 (per La Forest J); Liggett v 
Kensington [1993] 1 NZLR 257 (PC). 
29  Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury "The Stuffing of Minerva's Owl? Taxonomy and Taxidermy in Equity" 
(2009) 68 CLJ 537 at 541. 
30  PD Finn, above n 16, at 2. 
31  White City Tennis Club Ltd v John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1225; White City Tennis Club 
Ltd v John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 114, (2009) 261 ALR 86; John Alexander's Clubs Pty 
Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd, above n 6. 
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licence to use designated tennis courts. In 2005, Tennis NSW decided to sell the White City Land by 
tender closing on 15 April 2005. On 28 February, the Club and JACS had entered into a 
memorandum of understanding ("the MOU"). The MOU was to the effect that JACS was 
negotiating for the purchase of, or for an option to purchase, the whole or part of the White City 
Land by a company, White City Holdings ("WCH") that JACS was yet to incorporate. Existing 
members of the Club, together with members of the public, would be able to subscribe as 
"Foundation Members" for shares in WCH. Under Clause 3.7.1 of the MOU, JACS promised that if 
it succeeded in obtaining an option to purchase it would exercise that option on behalf of WCH, 
upon WCH simultaneously leasing the land back to a JACS-related entity ("JAWCC") for 99 years 
and entering into an operating agreement for the running of the new club. If JACS failed or was 
unable to exercise this option, then JACS "promised to seek to procure a further option exercisable 
by the Club".32  
On 10 May 2005, Tennis NSW sold the land to a third party, SGS. The Club and JACS 
negotiated with SGS and a further interested party to exercise the options set out in the MOU. All 
four parties entered into consecutive agreements culminating in the Third White City Agreement 
("the Third Agreement"). Clause 8(a) of the Third Agreement granted JACS or its nominee an 
option, exercisable before 30 June 2007, to purchase part of the White City Land ("the Option 
Land") for $6.73 million payable solely by JACS, failing which, under clause 8(b), the Club would 
have, until 30 September 2007, the option to purchase the Option Land at the same price. The Club 
also obtained a lease of part of the Option Land which was to last until 30 September 2007 but the 
parties agreed that this would terminate earlier if either JACS or the Club exercised the option to 
buy. Finally, as part of the agreement, the Club relinquished the existing lease of its clubhouse 
which otherwise would have expired only in 2020. Clause 8 was not hedged with the same 
qualifications as in the MOU. It "did not compel JACS to exercise the option on behalf of WCH and 
did not refer to any grant to JAWCC of a 99 year lease or to entry into an operating agreement".33 
Clauses 42 and 43 of the Third Agreement made reference back to the MOU. The former expressly 
acknowledged that the MOU continued according to its terms and that the Club and JACS would 
each perform their obligations under the Third Agreement in accordance with the MOU. The latter 
provided that, to the extent that there was any inconsistency between the Third Agreement and any 
other agreement between any of the parties, the former would prevail, unless specifically stated 
otherwise.34 
The relationship between the Club and JACS broke down, and in early April 2006 JACS served 
a notice of termination on the Club alleging that the Club had repudiated the MOU. JACS then 
  
32  John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd, above n 6, at [14]. 
33  Ibid, at [21]. 
34  Ibid, at [23]–[24]. 
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proceeded to exercise the clause 8 option through its nominee, Poplar Holdings Pty Ltd ("Poplar"). 
The Club sued JACS and contended that pursuant to the exercise of the option in clause 8(a) JACS 
owed it a fiduciary duty to hold the land on its behalf and that JACS had breached this duty by 
exercising the option through Poplar. This breach of fiduciary duty, the Club alleged, had caused it 
to lose the opportunity it had had to acquire the Option Land. It claimed a constructive trust over the 
Option Land subject to its paying Poplar $6.73 million, being the purchase price.  
B The Decision in the Lower Courts 
Young CJ in Equity, as he then was, dismissed the claim at first instance.35 Holding that "the 
Club was not affected by any special vulnerability, it had not relied on JACS to protect its interests, 
those running it were experienced in business and advised by independent solicitors, and it had 
equality of bargaining power with JACS",36 he concluded there was no fiduciary duty owed.  
The New South Wales Court of Appeal allowed the Club's appeal37 by declaring that the Club 
was the beneficiary of a constructive trust imposed on Poplar/JACS for unconscionable behaviour, 
and, although not necessary for its conclusion, stating that there was a fiduciary relationship 
between JACS and the Club.38  
C The Decision in the High Court of Australia 
The High Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal. As one commentator has observed, the 
Court's preliminary remarks about the nature of the Club's claims provided signposts as to the 
decision the Court was going to reach.39 In a unanimous40 judgment, the Court characterised as 
"striking" both the fact that the Club's claims were entirely non-contractual and that it was seeking 
an all-or-nothing claim of a constructive trust over the Option Land held by Poplar, despite the fact 
that early on in the piece it knew about and so could have sought a prohibitory injunction forbidding 
JACS from acquiring the land for Poplar.41 Their Honours abjured the fact that the Club was 
offering to pay Poplar only the price Poplar had paid for the Option Land and not offering to 
compensate Poplar for the loss of its use of money and/or disbursements. The Club's lack of regard 
  
35  White City Tennis Club Ltd v John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd, above n 31. 
36  John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd, above n 6, at [30]. 
37  White City Tennis Club Ltd v John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd, above n 31, at [63]–[102]. 
38  Ibid, at [83]–[91]. 
39  See Robert Flannigan "Collateral Contracting Implicitly May Vary Fiduciary Accountability" (2010) 126 
LQR 496. 
40  French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ.  
41  John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd, above n 6, at [37]–[38]. 
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for subsequently intervening third party interests of which it had notice was concerning. 42 The Court 
of Appeal's use of "joint venture" terminology in the three opening paragraphs of its judgment in the 
face of an express "disavowal of the existence of any joint venture by the Club at trial",43 as well as 
the express provision in clause 7.1 in the MOU that "nothing in the MOU (should) be taken to 
constitute the Parties as partners or as joint venturers for any purpose whatsoever"44 raised, so the 
High Court said, "a doubt about the Court of Appeal's reasoning".45  
The High Court then proceeded to review the Court of Appeal's construction of clause 3.7 of the 
MOU and clause 8 of the Third Agreement. It characterised as "flawed" the Court of Appeal's 
reasoning that the various agreements entered into by the parties were "a unity taking shape entirely 
from the MOU" so that "if JACS had exercised the option purportedly on its own behalf and for its 
own benefit while the MOU was on foot, JACS would have been in breach of … cl 3.7.1".46 
Instead, the High Court found that JACS's obligation in clause 3.7 of the MOU to exercise the 
option on behalf of WCH had been conditional on the grant of a 99 year lease and entry into an 
operating agreement with the related JACS entity (JAWCC). But, as it transpired, before this could 
even have occurred the parties had altered the content of the option clause in three subsequent 
agreements, each one differing in effect from its predecessor. None of these later agreements had 
required JACS to exercise the option on behalf of WCH. Instead, each one had given the option to 
JACS in its own right. All three agreements had required the Club to surrender its rights in relation 
to the White City Land but, whereas the first two agreements had granted JACS a two year lease 
over the Option Land, the Third Agreement had given the lease to the Club alone. The first two 
agreements had not provided for the continuation of the MOU. The Third Agreement, by contrast, 
had stated that the MOU was to continue except where inconsistent with that agreement.47 In the 
High Court's view, there were quite clearly inconsistent provisions as regards the option clause. This 
meant that the option to purchase in "[c]lause 3.7 had to give way, and cl 8 had to prevail".48 True it 
  
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid, at [44]. 
44  Ibid, at [42]. 
45  Ibid. This reasoning seems rather thin. The exclusion of the existence of a joint venture and hence of 
fiduciary duties – that alone being the purpose for which the joint venture's existence was alleged – solely 
on the basis of the parties' own expressed intention can certainly only ever be one consideration amongst 
many to be taken into account in the thorough examination otherwise required. It cannot suffice in and of 
itself to exclude fiduciary duties since that would be to honour form over substance in deciding a matter 
where substance must be the central concern. The Court's reference to "doubt' might of course indicate its 
awareness of this framework, but that is not clear.  
46  Ibid, at [51]–[52]. 
47  Ibid, at [52]–[55]. 
48  Ibid, at [50]. 
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was that the MOU did not expressly permit Poplar to exercise the option. But this was not in the 
High Court's view sufficient for the Club to claim equitable fraud, unconscionable conduct or breach 
of fiduciary duty by JACS.49 The option contemplated by the MOU was a conditional one only. 
And the two conditions were never carried out. The clause setting out that option was replaced by 
something quite different in form in the Third Agreement. The Club had freely agreed to the Third 
Agreement and to those preceding it. It did not allege that its consent had been procured by 
"mistake, misrepresentation, undue influence, duress, overbearing of the will, unequal bargaining 
power or concealment. Those who decided the Club should consent were experienced in business 
and legally advised."50 There was, in the High Court's view, no compelling basis for imposing a 
constructive trust in the Club's favour over the Option Land. 
So, if there was no equitable fraud or unconscionable bargain, did JACS owe the club fiduciary 
duties? The New South Wales Court of Appeal had answered this question in the affirmative. It held 
that when the Club agreed to clause 3.7.1 in the MOU it had placed itself in the hands of JACS and 
had trusted and relied on JACS to exercise any purchase option (including the option in cl 8 of the 
Third Agreement) on behalf of WCH, as it had said it would do. The Club was vulnerable to JACS. 
If JACS were to fail to honour its commitment to act for the Club this would preclude the Club from 
having the opportunity to acquire a valuable property right and to continue conducting the sporting 
activities it had been conducting for the previous 55 years on the White City Land.51  
The High Court rejected this line of reasoning which it said was based on the "twin ideas of 
vulnerability and reliance".52 It held that the question as to the existence of fiduciary duties could 
only be answered in the context of the contracts the Club had entered into with the various parties. 53 
Although the MOU had obliged JACS to obtain an option and deal with it in a certain way, all three 
subsequent White City agreements had given the purchase option to JACS uncondit ionally. The 
Club had freely consented to this; hence Young CJ in Equity's strong impression "that instead of 
there being an arrangement whereby the [Club] entrusted JACS to act on its behalf, the [Club] was 
going to act on its own behalf unless JACS complied with its demand".54 If the Club was 
vulnerable, it was only in the sense that every party to a contract is vulnerable to breach of the other 
party's duties by that other party.55 The unconditional nature of the later options acquired by JACS, 
  
49  Ibid, at [56]. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Ibid, at [80]. 
52  Ibid, at [81]. 
53  Ibid, at [82]. 
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid, at [83]. 
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to which the Club had consented, fundamentally altered the nature of any fiduciary obligations that 
JACS might have owed to the Club under the MOU. The Club could have "bargained for more 
precision in Clause 8, using its ability to refuse to agree to surrender the Lease".56 It had not done 
so. It had neither relied on JACS's representations, nor been overborne by JACS's greater strength. It 
had not depended on JACS to carry out dealings of which it was ignorant, nor had it trusted JACS to 
do anything.57 This analysis led the High Court to conclude that "[w]hat JACS and the Club did in 
relation to the Third White City Agreement and the exercise of JACS's option under cl 8(a), they did 
consulting their own interests, with knowledge of what the other was doing".58 Any vulnerability or 
reliance was grounded in contract only. If the Club chose not to make use of the "ample array of 
contractual remedies to protect itself" that was its choice. It might well have experienced difficulty, 
as a social club, in giving an undertaking as to damages; its members might well have wanted to 
continue using the facilities rather than being awarded monetary compensation; there might have 
been problems suing companies like JACS or Poplar which had no assets to meet any judgment 
made against them. All of these considerations, however, "did not justify converting the contractual 
relationship between JACS and the Club into a fiduciary relationship".59  
The High Court's analysis can be (and has been) questioned.60 The Club itself argued in the 
High Court (although not in the Court of Appeal) that clauses 3.7.1, 8 and 42 could be interpreted 
differently. Although its submission was given short shrift, there is a plausible argument that there 
was no inconsistency between the option in clause 3.7.1 of the MOU and that in clause 8 of the 
Third Agreement.61 Clause 42 of the Third Agreement contained a provision that the MOU would 
continue in accordance with its terms and that the Club and JACS would carry out their respective 
obligations under the Third Agreement in accordance with the MOU. Clause 3.7.1 of the MOU 
required JACS to acquire the land on behalf of WHC. Even if the later cl 8 in the Third Agreement 
gave the option to acquire the land to JACS alone, that was a matter between the grantor of the 
option and JACS – it said nothing about the relationship between JACS and the Club which was still 
governed by the MOU. Added to this, of course, is the fact that the two component parts of the 
condition – the 99 year lease and operating agreement – were exclusively in JACS's control. JACS 
claimed "repudiation" of the MOU by the Club. This self-serving claim (which might well be found 
not to have been justified in a subsequent trial) immediately absolved JACS from its responsibilities 
to set up the two entities. JACS would then of course be in breach of its contractual obligations, but 
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were it to be in breach of its concurrent fiduciary duties the possibility of the Club's getting the land 
back by means of a proprietary remedy was much stronger. Given this, was the High Court really 
justified in finding that any original fiduciary duties were impliedly converted into mere contractual 
ones by dint of the later arrangements?  
In one sense, the answer does not matter. What is important in all this, to reiterate the point we 
have made above, is that what the High Court did was to interpret the terms of the various contracts 
in order to ascertain the nature of the duties the parties had themselves assumed. Professor 
Flannigan's argument is, in effect, one for a different construction of the various contracts which, if 
adopted, might have led the Court to hold that fiduciary duties were owed and had not been 
extinguished. Perhaps the Club had this interpretation in mind in framing its argument, which might 
explain why it was so convinced of the correctness of its view that it was prepared to promote its 
"all-or-nothing" claim in the first place. This process is, however, no different from that adopted by 
courts in those other cases where fiduciary duties have been found to exist, and where the 
description "joint venture" has been applied to the parties' arrangement. 
The question of fiduciary duties could have ended at this point. However, it did not. In the High 
Court the Club, with leave of the Court, had advanced a further argument in relation to its fiduciary 
relationship case, relying on Mason J's widely accepted "undertaking" test (as described above) for 
establishing the existence of fiduciary duties. The Club contended that "the MOU was an 
undertaking by JACS to acquire property on the Club's behalf and hold it for interested parties".62 
The High Court took the opportunity to make some comments about fiduciary duties in general 
(perhaps in an attempt to quell increasing resort to the abracadabra-like ritual incantation of the term 
"joint venture" and the lure of fiduciary law as a means to access equity's extensive and powerful 
remedies when there is no sound doctrinal basis to make any such claim).63 Relying on the extra-
judicial writings of the late Justice Lehane, the High Court said that the phrases "for" or "on behalf 
of" which signify an undertaking must be strictly construed "lest the criterion they formulate 
become circular".64  
In every relationship that attracts fiduciary duties the purpose of the undertaking is gleaned from 
the terms of the arrangement between the parties understood in the context of its execution (to wit,  
the principal giving the fiduciary permission to deal in some way with the beneficiary's protected 
interest – be it property or opportunity – and the fiduciary undertaking to hold and use that protected 
interest exclusively for the principal). Thus, it is relatively easy to construe the undertaking given by 
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a trustee administering a trust estate, or by a director participating in the control and management of 
a company as fiduciary in nature65 (these being classical status-based fiduciaries). Similarly 
construed undertakings limited by their representative nature have also arisen as a matter of fact in 
the particular circumstances of cases (these being fact-based fiduciaries). If a person (Y) wants to 
bring herself within the class of fact-based beneficiaries of fiduciary duties (because she is not in a 
partnership, trust or other status-based relationship with X) then she must unequivocally 
demonstrate that X's offer to enter into a contract in a deal that will apparently benefit Y as well as 
X has become an undertaking to act for or on behalf of Y and therefore to act, in relation to that 
contract, solely in the interests of Y.66 If Y cannot establish the existence of such an undertaking by 
X, then the relationship, although definitely contractual, will not attract fiduciary duties. In addition, 
it should now be obvious that those who suggest that a contractual relationship does not attract 
fiduciary duties when and because it is commercial in nature are barking up the wrong tree. Such 
relationships fail to attract fact-based fiduciary duties because they fail to comply with the criteria 
necessary to establish the existence of fiduciary duties. 67 They do not fail to do so simply because 
they are commercial contractual relationships; their commercial nature does not give them immunity 
from fiduciary regulation. Quite the contrary, as is evidenced by the existence of countless 
"commercial" fiduciary relationships such as, for example, partnerships, agency arrangements, and 
superannuation trusts. But, importantly, where these commercial fiduciary relationships are 
creations of contract, then any fiduciary duties parties have assumed must accommodate themselves 
to the terms of the contract so as not to alter the contract's true scope and distort the matrix within 
which the parties themselves intended to operate.68 The express terms of the agreements governed 
the relationship between the Club and JACS. The Club "eschewed any attempt to imply a term into 
the MOU to the effect of the fiduciary obligation for which it contended".69  
An undertaking by a party giving rise to fiduciary duties is thus coupled with an entrusting to 
that party by the first party of the latter's property or opportunity. In his dissent in Hospital 
Products, Mason J found that the limited fiduciary duty in relation to product goodwill that HPI 
owed to USSC flowed from the fact that USSC had "entrusted the protection, promotion and 
custodianship of its product goodwill in the Australian market"70 to HPI, which HPI had then 
undertaken to safeguard for USSC solely. USSC was on the other side of the world. It lacked the 
capacity to control what was happening to its product goodwill in Australia. HPI was the only 
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person in contact with the Australian market. HPI had every opportunity to prefer its own interest 
and to subordinate USSC's interest, but its fiduciary duty to USSC for the protection of USSC's 
Australian product goodwill demanded the exact opposite.71 There were countless ways, alluded to 
by Mason J, in which Blackman as the alter ego of HPI could operate opportunistically: he could get 
to know customers as distributor rather than as competitor; he could surreptitiously start 
manufacturing his own products; he could obtain finance from USSC and other sources; he could 
reduce the supply of USSC's products in Australia and replace them with his own and then supply 
his own products to customers who might well believe that he was acting with USSC's authority.72  
But, as the High Court was quick to point out, none of these considerations was relevant with 
regard to the relationship between the Club and JACS. The Club was in constant contact with JACS 
as well as with other parties interested in the White City Land. The Club had the ability to find out 
what was happening and to protect its own interests. The relevant location was a small part of 
Sydney. "Even if JACS was in a position to deal secretly [with the other parties] it was not alleged 
to have done so".73 The Club had not entrusted to JACS any property or opportunity which could be 
abused,74 and there was no undertaking by JACS to the Club. 
In the final analysis, the overwhelming reason for the Club's failure in the High Court was 
because that Court attached greater weight to what it viewed as the very different nature of clause 
8(a) in the Third Agreement from clause 3.7.1 in the MOU. It was because of this that JACS was 
held not to owe fiduciary duties to the Club. There was no reference in cl 8 to granting the option for 
or on behalf of anyone other than JACS itself. The parties themselves had by their subsequent 
contracts extinguished any fiduciary duties that might have arisen by virtue of the MOU. To have 
found that a fiduciary duty was owed by JACS to the Club to acquire the Option Land solely for the 
Club, and that JACS had breached this duty by acquiring the Land for Poplar, and then to have 
determined that a constructive trust should be imposed on Poplar to hold the Land for the Club 
would have been to deny justice by invoking a "strained application of equitable ideas".75 The 
observation by Judge Learned Hand that "in commercial transactions it does not in the end promote 
justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect themselves" was given a 
hearty endorsement by the High Court bench who believed that the "Club's defence of the orders in 
the Court of Appeal created an unacceptable amount of strain of those kinds".76 
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V JOHN ALEXANDER'S CLUBS PTY LTD V WHITE CITY 
TENNIS CLUB LTD – FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN JOINT 
VENTURE ARRANGEMENTS 
What does this recent exposition of fiduciary principles from the High Court reveal about the 
existence of fiduciary duties in joint venture arrangements? In our view, it confirms the position we 
outlined in the opening part of this paper. The relationship in question will require detailed 
examination to ascertain exactly what duties the parties have actually taken upon themselves. It is 
not good enough, as the High Court so pithily put it, simply to label an enterprise as a joint venture 
in order to elicit a conclusion that fiduciary duties are owed between the parties. Of course, that very 
statement belies the proper nature of what we might term "real" or "true" joint ventures. If an 
examination of the duties undertaken reveals that loyalty is required, then the enterprise might well 
ex post be labelled a joint venture in which the parties will owe each other fiduciary duties. But such 
terminology admits confusion and leads to the unthinking labelling of relationships as "joint 
ventures" as if there were some magic consequence associated with the term - which is nothing 
more than abracadabra law. We would be much better off finding some other term for these 
relationships - such as "single instance partnership" or "partnership for a sole purpose" which would 
then allow the term "joint venture" to be employed in a wider commercial context without 
immediately muddying well established principles of equity. In the final analysis, "joint venture" 
appears presently to be no more than a ragbag term for a transactional relationship where a court has 
determined that the parties owe each other fiduciary duties.  
VI CONCLUSION 
Simply calling a relationship a "joint venture" is, in the end, unhelpful. In particular, "ascribing 
the label 'joint venture' to a business relationship between two or more parties does not of itself 
render that relationship fiduciary for some or all of its purposes".77 The fiduciary nature of the 
venture depends instead upon the particular vehicle the parties choose to adopt to carry out the joint 
venture and the terms of the underlying agreement between them, as the High Court of Australia in 
fact made so clear 25 years ago, not long after Professor Weinrib made the observation which we 
noted at the beginning of this paper and in the earlier part of the career of the outstanding contract 
scholar whom we seek to honour in this volume. In a passage which would be music to the ears of 
perhaps the foremost contemporary scholar writing on matters of contractual interpretation, the 
unanimous bench of the High Court in United Dominion Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd stated:78 
One would need a more confined and precise notion of what constitutes a "joint venture" than that which 
the term bears as a matter of ordinary language before it could be said by way of general proposition that 
the relationship between joint venturers is necessarily a fiduciary one … The most that can be said is 
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that whether or not the relationship between joint venturers is fiduciary will depend upon the form 
which the particular joint venture takes and upon the content of the obligations which the parties to it 
have undertaken. 
The position in New Zealand is, however, in a rather more confused state. In Chirnside v Fay79 
the Supreme Court appeared to accept that joint ventures are inherently fiduciary on the basis that 
they are analogous to a partnership which is of course an established fiduciary relationship. 80 In 
Tipping J's view, the common feature justifying fiduciary duties in any relationship was the 
entitlement or legitimate expectation of one party (the beneficiary) to repose trust and confidence in 
the other (the fiduciary).81 On this view, a fiduciary obligation need not, therefore, be voluntarily 
assumed by the fiduciary. Rather, it should be understood as one that arises by legal imposition. 
This supposes that the consensual undertaking of fiduciary duties is not their essential 
requirement;82 it is merely but one justification for the imposition of the duties. The issue of what 
circumstances will provide a legitimate justification for the reposing of trust and confidence appears 
to be a matter for analogising novel fact situations to existing accepted fiduciary relationships and to 
case law. For example, in Chirnside itself, the similarities between the relationship of the two 
parties' relationship and a traditional partnership supported a finding that Fay was entitled to repose 
trust and confidence in Chirnside such that Chirnside became subject to fiduciary duties (in the same 
way that partners are). Elias CJ, with whom Keith J concurred on this point, characterised the joint 
venture with a view to sharing profit as inherently fiduciary, given that it was "indistinguishable 
from a single transaction partnership".83  
On this reading of Chirnside, it thus appears to have been settled for New Zealand that a joint 
venture is deemed a fiduciary relationship by law, given its similarities to a partnership, in that it 
involves at least two parties undertaking a joint project on the understanding that profits will be 
divided among them – thus necessarily giving rise to legitimate expectations of loyalty being due 
from each to the other. In two subsequent cases,84 the Supreme Court has, however, sought to refine 
and narrow the meaning of joint venture, so that the potential for a fiduciary obligation to arise 
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automatically is also accordingly reduced, leaving the law somewhat less certain than it appeared to 
be immediately after Chirnside.85  
The implications for wider fiduciary law of this area and the recognition of fiduciary duties and 
application of equitable remedies in joint venture contexts remain therefore unfortunately somewhat 
unclear and incoherent. It is surely incumbent upon the superior courts to provide at the next 
opportunity a clear and conceptually sound analysis of the issues discussed in this paper. As a first 
step, the notions that joint ventures are not only legally definable as stand-alone legal institutions 
but also automatically give rise to status-based fiduciary duties should be knocked on the head once 
and for all. To some degree, the High Court of Australia in the John Alexander's Clubs case has 
gone some way to doing just that, but regrettably the language used therein, and certainly the actual 
process undertaken to resolve the issue before the Court, do not provide the level of clarity and 
certainty which the issue requires from a supreme appellate court. In the meantime, it is respectfully 
suggested that more can usefully be gleaned from the judgment of Finn J in Gibson Motorsport 
Merchandise Pty Ltd v Forbes.86 This judgment deserves to be more widely known. Perhaps it will 
take a place at the forefront of the efforts in Australia to answer the question we set ourselves as the 
title of this paper: the fiduciary duties of joint venture parties – when do they arise and what do they 
comprise? The judgment will repay careful analysis in New Zealand also. 
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